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I. INTRODUCTION AND BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Religion. The word alone makes some people shiver in fear or cringe
with repulsion. After all, “religion” has been charged with causing wars,
coercing men and women to murder, and convincing individuals to isolate
themselves from family and friends.1 Yet organized religion has been practiced throughout the world since 2400-2300 BCE, if not earlier.2 There are
over two billion believers in Christianity (including Catholics, Protestants,
Anglicans, and Orthodox), approximately 1.5 billion believers in Islam,
nearly one billion Hindis, and almost half a billion Buddhists.3 Of just these
four major religions, the number of religious peoples constitutes approximately 76.7% of the world’s population of over seven billion humans.4 In
addition, religion has created some of the most philanthropic, communityoriented, and peace-promoting organizations in the entire world.5
1.
E.g., DAVID G. BROMLEY & J. GORDON MELTON, CULTS, RELIGION, AND
VIOLENCE (2002).
2.
See SALOMON REINACH, ORPHEUS: A GENERAL HISTORY OF RELIGIONS 26 (Florence Simmonds trans., 1909). See also KAREN FARRINGTON, THE HISTORY OF RELIGION
(1998).
3.
See The World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (2012),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html.
4.
See id.
5.
See, e.g., DOROTHY M. BROWN & ELIZABETH MCKEOWN, THE POOR BELONG TO
US: CATHOLIC CHARITIES AND AMERICAN WELFARE 151 (1997). See also MARY J. OATES,
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When the First Amendment of the United States Constitution was ratified in 1791, most Americans at the time, including James Madison, agreed
that the federal government must not identify one specific religion and provide it financial and legal support, as had occurred in most European countries.6 In a letter to the Danbury Baptists in 1802, Thomas Jefferson wrote
that, “religion is a matter which lies solely between Man & his God, that he
owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legitimate
powers of government reach actions only, & not opinions . . . .”7 The United States of America was founded, in large part, due to the heavy influence
of the Church of England in people’s lives and the Church’s influence and
power over Great Britain and its territories, which led to the persecution of
numerous religious peoples.8 Jefferson seemed to be noting his awareness
of this fact by stating that religion is not a matter of one’s relationship between himself, his country, and his God.9 Rather, Jefferson noted, religion
is a relationship between an individual and God.10 It was in this same letter
that Jefferson referred to the newly enacted First Amendment as having
created a “wall of separation between Church & State.”11 While some interpreters understand this language literally to mean that there should be no
overlap between any government act and any religious act or display, there
are others who find that complete separation is not realistically possible and
that Jefferson was merely referring to the First Amendment’s protection
against one power having control over the other.12
THE CATHOLIC PHILANTHROPIC TRADITION IN AMERICA (1995); TIMOTHY PATRICK JACKSON,
THE PRIORITY OF LOVE: CHRISTIAN CHARITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2003).
6.
James Madison, Holograph Notes for a Speech Introducing the Bill of Rights, in
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS MANUSCRIPT DIVISION (June 8, 1789), available at
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel06.html.
7.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802), available
at http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html.
8.
See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1874 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1891) (1833). See also Everson v. Bd. of
Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (“A large proportion of the early settlers of this
country came here from Europe to escape the bondage of laws which compelled them to
support and attend government favored churches.”).
9.
Jefferson, supra note 7.
10.
Id.
11.
Id.
12. See, e.g., Shanin Rezai, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos
in Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 503, 507 (1990) (citing 14 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281-82 (A. Lipscomb ed., 1904) (declaring that religious
matters belong solely “between man and God”)). See also Phillip Marbury, Audience Maturity and the Object of the Establishment Clause, 6 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 565, 577-78 (2012)
(describing the view that the religious clauses are constantly in tension); J. Clifford Wallace,
Framers’ Establishment Clause: How High the Wall?, 2001 BYU L. REV. 755, 764-67
(2001) (discussing actions by the framers which indicate that they did not intend to create a
complete separation of church and state).
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The establishment and free exercise clauses in the First Amendment
articulate in pertinent part that, “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”13
The two clauses are both complementary and conflicting.14 The establishment clause restricts the government while the free exercise Clause seems
to focus more on the individual liberty to freely express one’s beliefs.15
The United States Supreme Court has struggled over the years to create a balance between governmental interference with people’s religious
beliefs and people’s freedom to exercise those beliefs.16 Over the years, the
Supreme Court has defined numerous tests to create a more “cut-and-dry”
view of these First Amendment clauses.17 For example, tests applied in the
contexts of governments requiring oaths of fidelity to a faith, or tithing or
giving financial support to churches tend to have more predictable, straightforward results.18 However, the Court has struggled, and continues to struggle, to define a fine line with regard to public displays of religious symbols.
After all, in most cases, no citizen has been required or coerced to support
such symbols.19 Nevertheless, these displays may be more than simply passive representations of our country’s heritage and traditions.20 Perhaps these
religious symbols demonstrate a governmental endorsement of religion,
which could possibly be construed as some form of psychological coercion.21
Regardless of whatever views one may have in regard to religion in
general, a particular faith, or the establishment clause, there has been little
argument among the Supreme Court justices that it is necessary to apply a
definite test to cases involving religion in order to create a level of constitu13.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1275 (Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther eds.,
17th ed. 2010) (“[The clauses] protect overlapping values, but they often exert conflicting
pressures.”).
15.
See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760
(1995) (“[P]rivate religious speech . . . is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as
secular private expression.”).
16.
See Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk, 132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012) (“This
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence is undoubtedly in need of clarity . . . .”).
17.
E.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (creating the first establishment
clause analysis).
18.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 14, at 1318.
19.
See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). One exception to this
statement is Stone v. Graham, in which Kentucky passed a law requiring all public schools
to post the Ten Commandments in every classroom. 449 U.S. 39 (1980). The Supreme Court
found this law to be unconstitutional because it not only established a religion, but also
inhibited free exercise. See id.
20.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 14, at 1340.
21.
See id. at 1352.
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tional stability and clarity.22 The underlying question is which test, if any,
of the many that have evolved in recent years should apply, or if a new test
is necessary.
The scope of this Comment focuses exclusively on Supreme Court
tests used in regard to establishment clause cases involving public displays
of religious symbols.23 It argues for a single test to be applied solely within
the specific context of cases involving the public display of religious symbols. Part II introduces the main establishment clause tests.24 Part III takes
an in-depth look at the problems with each of the tests, and how each test
will or will not work in religious display cases. Part IV suggests that the
coercion test may be best applied in religious display cases because religious displays, as passive objects, should not be subjected to the same level
of scrutiny as other religious actions with active government involvement.
Part V proposes a few minor changes to the current coercion analysis in
order to achieve the fairest and most just results.

II. SEMINAL CASES INSTITUTING THE VARIOUS ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE TESTS, AS APPLIED TO RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS
A.

LEMON V. KURTZMAN (“LEMON TEST”)

In 1971, the Court decided Lemon v. Kurtzman, a case which involved
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes that provided state aid to parochial
elementary and secondary schools.25 The Court held that both statutes were
violations of the establishment clause.26 Writing for the Court, Justice
Burger laid out a three-part test with the intention of drawing a fine line as
to the constitutionality of government acts in relation to religion.27 “First,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, [and]
finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement
22.
Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 22 (2011)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“It is difficult to imagine an area of the law more in need of clarity
. . . .”).
23.
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 67 (2005); Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573;
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
24.
Van Orden, 545 U.S. 67 (introducing the Van Orden test); Cnty. of Allegheny,
492 U.S. 573 (introducing the coercion test); Lynch, 465 U.S. 668 (introducing the endorsement test); Lemon, 403 U.S. 602 (introducing the Lemon test).
25.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606.
26.
Id. at 607.
27.
Id. at 612 (“In the absence of precisely stated constitutional prohibitions, we
must draw lines with reference to the three main evils against which the Establishment
Clause was intended to afford protection: ‘sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.’”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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with religion.’”28 This infamous test set some of the groundwork for a single analysis that courts could apply to all religion cases. However, the Lemon test has since been modified and highly criticized over the years as being
overly restrictive of religion.29
B.

LYNCH V. DONNELLY (“ENDORSEMENT TEST”)

Several years later, in 1984, the Supreme Court decided a case that involved the public display of a crèche (nativity scene) among other Christmas-related figures and decorations at a public park.30 The other items in
the Christmas display included such secular decorations as Santa Claus,
reindeer, Christmas trees, and a sign that read “SEASONS
GREETINGS.”31 The Court, choosing not to apply the Lemon test, upheld
the constitutionality of the crèche display, noting that the occasional advancement of religion due to governmental actions is not always unconstitutional.32 Citing Lemon, the Court recognized that it must create a balance
between the establishment and free exercise clauses in order to prevent the
“unnecessary intrusion of either the church or the state upon the other, and
the reality that . . . total separation of the two is not possible.”33 The Supreme Court added that the district court erred in finding the crèche unconstitutional, because it focused solely on the crèche and did not take into
context the fact that the religious display was surrounded by purely secular
symbols.34 As such, the government’s purpose in allowing the display of the
crèche was not to subtly advocate a particular religious message, but rather
to simply celebrate the holidays, which was a legitimate secular purpose
since a crèche has considerable historical significance in relation to the
Christmas holiday.35

28.
Id. at 612-13.
29.
See, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686 (finding that the Lemon test was not useful in the Court's analysis); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973) (noting that the three
prongs in Lemon were “no more than helpful signposts”). See also McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU
of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 900 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's use of the
Lemon test and its modifications as “ratchet[ing] up the Court's hostility to religion”); Rezai,
supra note 12, at 519. (“For all practical purposes, the Lemon test has lost its vitality and
effectiveness.”).
30.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
31.
Id. at 671.
32.
Id. at 683.
33.
Id. at 672. See also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 (“[T]otal separation is not possible
in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and religious organizations is
inevitable.”).
34.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680.
35.
See id. at 680-81.

2014]

AN INCONVENIENT TRUTH

437

It was in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence that a new test evolved.36
She explained that there are two ways that a government can violate the
establishment clause, generally: (1) “excessive entanglement with religious
institutions,” and (2) “government endorsement or disapproval of religion.”37 Justice O’Connor stated that the effects of governmental endorsement of a particular religion make nonparticipants feel like outsiders to the
political community, and make participants feel like they are insiders and
favored members of society, while governmental disapproval of religion
sends the opposite effect.38 The Court has, since then, applied this endorsement test using the reasonable person standard.39
In an attempt to clarify the Lemon test, Justice O’Connor explained
that the secular purpose prong of the test asks whether the government’s
purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.40 She added that the effect
prong of Lemon (to neither advance nor inhibit religion) asks whether, regardless of the governmental purpose, the practice “conveys a message of
endorsement or disapproval.”41 In order to determine whether a government
activity endorses religion, a court must take into consideration, but not solely focus on, historical facts.42 A court must also take into account the social
context of the situation, namely its particular physical setting.43 Since a
crèche is a traditional holiday symbol commonly displayed with other
strictly secular symbols, and because in this case the crèche was displayed
with other secular holiday decorations, this did not show any government
endorsement of religion.44
C.

ALLEGHENY COUNTY V. GREATER PITTSBURGH ACLU
(“COERCION TEST”)

A few years later in 1989, the Supreme Court adopted and applied Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test to decide a case involving the public dis-

36.
Id. at 687-94 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
37.
Id. at 687-88.
38.
See id. at 688.
39.
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680. See also Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 773 (1995) (“[T]he endorsement test necessarily focuses upon the
perception of a reasonable, informed observer.”); Modrovich v. Allegheny Cnty., 385 F.3d
397, 401 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying the endorsement test through the reasonable observer
standard).
40.
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
41.
Id. at 690.
42.
Id. at 693.
43.
See id. at 692, 694 (“[T]he question is . . . in large part a legal question to be
answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts.”).
44.
See id. at 692-93.
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play of a crèche and a menorah.45 The crèche was placed at the county
courthouse on the main staircase.46 It had several poinsettia plants and a
small evergreen tree surrounding it along with a sign that read “Gloria in
Excelsis Deo” (Latin for “Glory to God in the Highest”).47 The Chanukah
menorah was located just outside the city-county building with a large
Christmas tree and a sign that said “Salute to Liberty” right next to it.48 Distinguishing the crèche in this case from Lynch, the Court found distinct
differences.49 The nativity scene in Lynch was surrounded by numerous
purely secular holiday decorations while the crèche in this case stood alone
as the central display.50 The floral display and evergreen tree were not secular symbols of equal stature with Santa Claus and Christmas trees; in fact,
the Court argued that the floral display actually contributed to the endorsement of Christianity conveyed by the crèche.51 In addition, the Court noted
that the staircase where the crèche was displayed was not open to all religions on an equal basis, so the government was favoring sectarian religious
expression.52
The menorah, on the other hand, was found to be constitutional.53 Justice Blackmun, who wrote for the Court, noted that by placing the menorah
next to a large Christmas tree, both the Christmas (Christian) and Chanukah
(Jewish) holidays were represented; however, this fact alone was not sufficient to make the menorah constitutional because if the purpose was to support both Christianity and Judaism, then this was effectively endorsing these religions.54 The Court explained that the Chanukah was more significant
as a cultural rather than religious holiday, which elevated its secularity.55
Due to the large size of the Christmas tree (forty-five feet) in contrast to the
much smaller menorah (only a few feet in height), and in conjunction with a
sign that said the City of Pittsburgh supported liberty, the Court held that
the display did not endorse any religion.56 Justice Blackmun also added that
the Christmas tree was a religious and secular symbol, so putting this tree

45.
Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
46.
See id. at 578.
47.
Id. at 580.
48.
Id. at 578, 582.
49.
Id. at 598-602.
50.
See Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598.
51.
See id. at 599 (“The floral decoration surrounding the crèche contributes to,
rather than detracts from, the endorsement of religion conveyed by the crèche.”).
52.
See id. at 599-600.
53.
See id. at 621.
54.
See id. at 614-16.
55.
See Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 586-87 (“This socially heightened status of
Chanukah reflects its cultural or secular dimension.”).
56.
See id. at 617-20.
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near a courthouse showed no endorsement of the Christian faith.57 The
overall display merely promoted the city’s “secular recognition of different
traditions for celebrating the winter-holiday season.”58
In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy sharply criticized the majority’s decision, arguing that the crèche should also have been
found constitutional.59 He condemned the Court’s application of Justice
O’Connor’s endorsement test as a mere modification of the Lemon test,
stating that both tests were too restrictive of religious liberty.60 Justice Kennedy added that the Court should not have applied Justice O’Connor’s test
because it came from a concurring opinion, which according to him should
not have taken precedence over the majority opinion in Lynch.61
As an alternative to the endorsement test, Justice Kennedy proposed a
new test known as the “coercion test.”62 He denoted two principles limiting
government’s role in religion:
[1] [G]overnment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise;
and . . . [2] may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to
religion in such a degree that it in fact ‘establishes
a (state) religion or religious faith, or tends to do
so.’63
Justice Kennedy explained that the coercion need not be as direct as a
tax aiding a specific religion or a requirement of an oath to religion, but it
may be so subtle as simply an accommodation or recognition of a faith, in

57.
See id. at 616-17 (“The Christmas tree, unlike the menorah, is not itself a religious symbol. Although Christmas trees once carried religious connotations, today they
typify the secular celebration of Christmas.”).
58.
Id. at 620.
59.
See id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“This
view of the Establishment Clause reflects an unjustified hostility toward religion, a hostility
inconsistent with our history and our precedents . . . . The crèche display is constitutional.”).
60.
See Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“[T]he Establishment Clause permits government some latitude in recognizing and accommodating the central role religion plays in our society. Any approach less
sensitive to our heritage would border on latent hostility toward religion.”).
61.
See id. at 668 (“It has never been my understanding that a concurring opinion . .
. could take precedence over an opinion joined in its entirety by five Members . . . . [S]tare
decisis directs us to adhere not only to the holdings of our prior cases, but also to their explications of the governing rules of law.”).
62.
See id. at 629, 659.
63.
Id. at 659 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
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an extreme case.64 A passive or symbolic display will, in most cases, not
infringe upon religious liberty unless the “symbolic recognition or accommodation advances religion to such a degree that it actually establishes a
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.”65 Any non-coercive governmental action within this realm will not violate the establishment clause,
Justice Kennedy stated, unless the action directly benefits a religion in such
a way that is more extensive than past practices.66 Applying his test to the
facts of the case, Justice Kennedy found that the crèche and menorah were
“purely passive symbols of religious holidays,”67 both of which had acquired secular meaning. Therefore, since, according to Justice Kennedy
there was no coercion or benefit to religion involved, both displays should
have been found constitutional.68
Justice Kennedy’s proposal of his coercion test was highly criticized
by his colleagues as they strongly refuted his arguments in their majority
and concurring opinions.69 Justice Blackmun defended the Court’s position,
64.
See id. at 661 (giving an example that the establishment clause forbids “the
permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall . . . not because government
speech about religion is per se suspect . . . but because such an obtrusive year-round religious display would place the government's weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize
on behalf of a particular religion”).
65.
Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 662 (internal quotation marks omitted).
66.
See id. at 662-63 (“Noncoercive government action within the realm of flexible
accommodation or passive acknowledgment of existing symbols does not violate the Establishment Clause unless it benefits religion in a way more direct and more substantial than
practices that are accepted in our national heritage.”).
67.
Justice Kennedy stated that:
If government is to participate in its citizens’ celebration of a
holiday that contains both a secular and a religious component,
enforced recognition of only the secular aspect would signify
the callous indifference toward religious faith that our cases
and traditions do not require; for by commemorating the holiday only as it is celebrated by nonadherents, the government
would be refusing to acknowledge the plain fact, and the historical reality, that many of its citizens celebrate the religious
aspects of the holiday as well.
See id. at 663-64.
68.
See id. at 665-67.
69.
Justice Blackmun responded to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and dissent,
stating:
Although Justice Kennedy repeatedly accuses the Court of
harboring a “latent hostility” or “callous indifference” toward
religion, nothing could be further from the truth, and the accusations could be said to be as offensive as they are absurd. Justice Kennedy apparently has misperceived a respect for religious pluralism, a respect commanded by the Constitution, as
hostility or indifference to religion. No misperception could be
more antithetical to the values embodied in the Establishment
Clause.
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stating that the majority decision was not discriminatory against religion.70
Justice Blackmun attempted to justify the Court’s position, arguing that the
Constitution requires the government to remain secular but clarified that
“[a] secular state . . . is not the same as an atheistic or antireligious state. A
secular state establishes neither atheism nor religion as its official creed.”71
Justice O’Connor also addressed Justice Kennedy’s newly created test in
her concurring opinion.72 While Justice Kennedy had criticized Justice
O’Connor’s test for its lack of clarity and decisiveness in its application,
Justice O’Connor pointed out the same in Justice Kennedy’s coercion test,
stating that his test still involved judgment and hard choices and was not as
“cut-and-dry” as he might have thought.73 Justice O’Connor agreed that it
was an important obligation of the Court to draw lines as to the constitutionality of religious displays but that no test could be so perfect as not to
face any issues in its application.74
D.

VAN ORDEN V. PERRY (“VAN ORDEN TEST”)

In 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to a unique case involving the public display of a monument of the Ten Commandments, and upheld the religious symbol under a newly created analysis.75 In 1961, a largely secular and patriotic organization known as the Fraternal Order of Eagles
donated a monument which consisted of an eagle grasping the American
flag, the eye inside a pyramid, and two small tablets with ancient script
meant to represent the Ten Commandments along with signs representing
the tablets’ religious significance.76 The monument was placed on the
grounds of the Texas state capitol among numerous other monuments.77
Chief Justice Rehnquist found the application of the Lemon test (or
any test for that matter) unhelpful in the Court’s analysis and chose instead
Id. at 610.
70.
See Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 610.
71.
Id. at 610-11 (“[C]onfining the government's own celebration of Christmas to
the holiday's secular aspects does not favor the religious beliefs of non-Christians over those
of Christians. Rather, it simply permits the government to acknowledge the holiday without
expressing an allegiance . . . .”).
72.
Id. at 627 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
73.
See id. at 629.
74.
See id. at 629-30 (inquiring of Justice Kennedy’s test, “[w]ould the Christmastime display of a crèche inside a courtroom be ‘coercive’ if subpoenaed witnesses had no
opportunity to ‘turn their backs’ and walk away? Would displaying a crèche in front of a
public school violate the Establishment Clause under Justice Kennedy's test?”).
75.
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
76.
Id. at 681-82. The religious signs included Stars of David (Jewish symbols) and
Greek letters, which represent Christ. Id.
77.
Id. at 681.
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to look at the context of the monument and the United States’ history and
heritage for his analysis.78 Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the issue that
had plagued the Court since the inception of the First Amendment: that one
goal of the Supreme Court is to create stability in separation of the church
and state but not to the detriment of religious peoples or the heritage of the
United States.79 The Court could not deny the fact that the Ten Commandments have religious significance; however, the Court noted that “[s]imply
having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious
doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause.”80 The purpose
behind the monument’s public display was merely to acknowledge the role
that these ten laws played in our nation’s heritage and also in the history
and traditions of Texas.81 Texas utilized its capitol grounds as a means of
recognizing the state’s political and legal history.82 This “dual significance,” as the Court called it, contributed to the separate goals of both religion and government.83 The passive display of the monument was shown to
represent the state’s heritage and traditions, and its context of being exhibited with other secular monuments was sufficient to be found constitutional.84
Oftentimes in these religious cases, the Supreme Court has, for whatever reason, decided not to apply any of the several proposed and commonly used tests.85 Van Orden v. Perry is one such case, and the several concurrences point out the majority’s failure to apply any sort of test in its analysis.86 Justice Thomas wrote that he was in complete agreement with the
Chief Justice’s majority opinion, but discussed in his concurrence the problems with the tests the Court had applied over the years.87 Justice Thomas
expressed a desire to “return to the basics,” that is, to apply the original
intent of the establishment clause; he argued that deciding religious cases in
78.
See id. at 686 (“Instead, our analysis is driven both by the nature of the monument and by our Nation’s history.”).
79.
See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 683-84 (“Our cases, Januslike, point in two directions in applying the Establishment Clause. One face looks toward the strong role played by
religion and religious traditions . . . . The other face looks toward the principle that governmental intervention in religious matters can itself endanger religious freedom.”).
80.
Id. at 690.
81.
See id. at 687-90.
82.
See id. at 691.
83.
Id. at 692.
84.
See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691-92.
85.
See, e.g., id. at 686 (“Whatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger
scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we think it not useful in dealing with the sort
of passive monument . . . .”).
86.
See Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677 (Scalia, J., concurring) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
87.
See id. at 692-93 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[The Chief Justice] properly recognizes the role of religion in this Nation’s history and the permissibility of government displays acknowledging that history.”).
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this manner would be much simpler than attempting to apply any specific
test.88 He explained that the framers of the Constitution understood the
word “establishment” to mean some form of legal coercion, typically by
“force of law and threat of penalty,”89 since that is what had happened in
the European countries controlled by the Catholic Church.90 While he never
explicitly referenced Justice Kennedy’s concurring and dissenting opinion
in County of Allegheny, Justice Thomas nevertheless seemed to be expressing some support for Justice Kennedy’s coercion test. He demonstrated this
by claiming that the plaintiff, Mr. Van Orden, had never actually been
compelled (or coerced) to do anything; he was simply a mere passerby of a
monument that he found offensive.91 Justice Thomas argued that the
Court’s analysis in future cases would be much simpler if it were to adopt
coercion “as the touchstone for our Establishment Clause inquiry.”92
Justice Breyer, in a separate concurrence, somewhat agreed with Justice Thomas’s argument that past tests were ineffective in establishment
clause analyses but seemed to agree more with Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
analysis in the majority opinion which did not apply any specific test.93
Justice Breyer acknowledged that there is no clear way by which to determine a religious display’s constitutionality.94 He explained that the goal of
most establishment clause tests is to maintain some level of government
neutrality but that it is difficult to determine what exactly is “neutral.”95 No
test can substitute for pure legal analysis.96 This legal judgment, Justice
Breyer continued, must stay true to the purposes of the religion clauses and
must take into account the “context and consequences measured in light of

88.
Id. (“[O]ur task would be far simpler if we returned to the original meaning of
the word ‘establishment’ than it is under the various approaches this Court now uses.”).
89.
Id. at 693 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
90.
See CAROLYN M. WARNER, CONFESSIONS OF AN INTEREST GROUP: THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH & POLITICAL PARTIES IN EUROPE 203 (2000), available at
https://www.ulib.niu.edu:9443/login?url=http://site.ebrary.com/lib/niluniv/Doc?id=1003190
3. See also THOMAS E. WOODS, HOW THE CATHOLIC CHURCH BUILT WESTERN CIVILIZATION
(2005).
91.
See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 694 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The mere presence
of the monument along [Van Orden’s] path involves no coercion and thus does not violate
the Establishment Clause.”).
92.
Id. at 697.
93.
See id. at 698-705 (Breyer, J., concurring).
94.
See id. at 698.
95.
See id. at 699 (explaining that “tests designed to measure ‘neutrality’ alone are
insufficient”).
96.
See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[O]ne will inevitably
find difficult borderline cases. And in such cases, I see no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.”).
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those purposes.”97 In certain contexts, a display may convey a religious
message, a secular moral message, a historical message, or any combination
of the three.98 Justice Breyer concluded that, since the Ten Commandments
monument communicated a secular message in conjunction with its religious connotations, the display would have been constitutional even under
the scrutiny of the Lemon test.99 Nevertheless, Justice Breyer warned that,
in these religious display cases, it is important to “‘distinguish between real
threat and mere shadow,’” concluding that this case was merely a shadow.100

III. CRITICISMS OF THE VARIOUS TESTS AND WHY ALL EXCEPT THE
COERCION TEST DO NOT WORK FOR RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS
Every establishment clause test has been highly criticized by judges
and scholars, while also being highly acclaimed by others.101 Each test has
both good and bad aspects to its analysis, and some tests have been altered
and improved over time. Yet within this messy, discombobulated establishment clause jurisprudence, the coercion test stands above the other tests
in its straightforward applicability to religious display cases.
A.

CRITICISMS, CONUNDRUMS, AND CLARIFICATIONS OF THE
LEMON TEST

Since Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court and lower courts have
rarely applied the Lemon test, although the test still appears in court opinions occasionally.102 Also since Lemon, the Supreme Court and many lower
courts have continued to modify and improve the Lemon test.103 The test,
97.
Id. at 700.
98.
See id. at 701.
99.
See id. at 703-04.
100.
Id. at 704 (citing Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308
(1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
101.
E.g., Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court's Four Establishment
Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 725 (2006) (noting the flaws in each of the Supreme Court’s
establishment clause tests); Kevin M. Detroy, Note, A Coherent Standard, if You Please:
The Supreme Court’s Failure to Adhere to a Consistent Standard in Establishment Clause
Cases and Why a Revision of Justice O’Connor’s Endorsement Test May Be Just What Is
Needed, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 571 (2006) (criticizing other establishment clause tests but supporting endorsement).
102.
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (applying the Lemon
test to a voucher program for parochial schools); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch.,
533 U.S. 98 (2001) (failing to apply the Lemon test in the Court’s analysis).
103.
See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 206 (1997) (explaining “[i]t is simplest to recognize why
entanglement is significant and treat it . . . as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute’s effect,”
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though well intended, has been applied arbitrarily, which has created confusion within the court system.104 Not only has the Lemon test slowly faded
out of usage, but it has also been highly criticized.105 Justice Scalia expressed his distaste for the Lemon test (including the revised version in the
form of the endorsement test) when he described it as “some ghoul in a latenight horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad,
after being repeatedly killed and buried,,Lemon stalks our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school
[board] attorneys . . . .”106
Although the Court seems to have intended the Lemon test to be a uniform tool of analysis for all establishment clause cases, the Court has since
recognized that, although the test may be useful, it is not binding.107 The
Court indicated that this test provides “no more than helpful posts.”108 Even
Justice Burger, who wrote the majority opinion for Lemon v. Kurtzman,
later wrote that all establishment clause standards “should rather be viewed
as guidelines with which to identify instances in which the objectives of the
Religion Clauses have been impaired.”109 The Lemon test was a starting
point for establishment clause jurisprudence, but as this area of the law has
developed and there have been many more cases, the flaws in this test have
become more visible.

1.

Lemon Poses Serious Problems in its Application

The Lemon test has been criticized for its hostility toward religion as
well as its secular and separationist leaning when applied.110 To those acrather than following the Lemon test and treating entanglement as a separate prong); Books
v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000) (applying the first two prongs of the Lemon
test, but not the entanglement prong).
104.
Rezai, supra note 12, at 507 (noting that courts have “manipulated, or even
ignored, the Lemon standard in order to impose a different doctrinal viewpoint”).
105.
See ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 773 (8th Cir.
2005) (criticizing the Lemon test). See also Douglas G. Smith, The Constitutionality of Religious Symbolism After McCreary and Van Orden, 12 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 93, 108 (2007)
(“Not only did the [C]ourt largely ignore the McCreary decision, it went so far as to hold
that the Lemon test was inapplicable in cases involving public displays containing religious
symbolism.”).
106.
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
107.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (demonstrating that, despite Lemon’s usefulness, the Court was unwilling “to be confined to any single test or criterion in this
sensitive area.”).
108.
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
109.
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971).
110.
See Gey, supra note 101, at 732-33 (criticizing Lemon for its restrictiveness of
religion).
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comodationists of religion, the test is inherently restrictive of religious liberty.111
The secular purpose prong of Lemon is difficult to apply to cases involving public displays of religious symbols because these symbols are all,
without doubt, religious in some facet.112 Although the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that a display can have a religious meaning and a secular
purpose simultaneously,113 courts have struggled to balance the government’s stated secular purpose against the implicit religious purpose behind
the display in deciding its constitutionality.114 The purpose prong has also
been criticized for preventing judges from exercising their legal judgment,
effectively limiting their power.115
Much confusion has also arisen from the effect prong of the Lemon
test, which provides that government involvement should neither advance
nor inhibit religion.116 Without using Justice O’Connor’s reasonable person
standard (yet), this prong seems wholly subjective. It is much easier to
show that an act of monetary donation to a religious organization is advancing religion than it is to say that the display of a religious monument on
government property is advancing religion. A key difference is that, in giving money, the government is making an affirmative act; it is actively and
openly supporting a religious cause which in effect advances religion in
some respect as the funds are used to further those religious objectives.117 In
contrast, the display of a religious symbol is a passive act in which the dis111.
See Jennifer H. Greenhalgh, Comment, The Establishment Clause and Government Religious Displays: The Court That Stole Christmas, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1053, 1076
(1999) (noting the difference in views between accomodationists and separationists).
112.
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690 (2005) (“Of course, the Ten Commandments are religious–they were so viewed at their inception and so remain. The monument,
therefore, has religious significance.”).
113.
Id. at 690-92.
114.
See Amy J. Alexander, Comment, When Life Gives You the Lemon Test: An
Overview of the Lemon Test and Its Application, 3 PHOENIX L. REV. 641, 656-58 (2010)
(explaining that “in both Lynch v. Donnelly and Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free School District, the Court simply searched for any secular purpose,” but “[o]n the other
hand, at times the Court has followed Stone and invalidated state actions with merely pretextual secular justifications”).
115.
See Gey, supra note 101, at 733.
116.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). See also Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cnty., 612 F. Supp. 2d 1163,
1178 (Dist. Colo. 2009) (noting that Lemon has been criticized but still remains controlling
law); Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 1017, 1030 (10th Cir. 2008) (interpreting
the effect prong of the Lemon test in light of Justice O’Connor’s endorsement analysis).
117.
See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Bugher, 249 F.3d 606, 612 (7th Cir.
2001) (“[R]egardless of whether schools are pervasively sectarian or not, states may not
make unrestricted cash payments directly to religious institutions . . . . The Supreme Court
has recognized that special Establishment Clause dangers exist where the government makes
direct money payments to sectarian institutions.”) (internal quotations omitted).
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play simply remains in its location without actively promoting the religion
of any group.118 However, the Lemon Court did not distinguish between
actively or passively advancing religion, which seems to have hurt its analysis.119
If a government did not allow the display of any religious symbols at
any time on any public property, would it effectively be “inhibiting” religion? Under current case law, this refusal to display any religious symbol
would not inhibit religion within the meaning of the establishment clause
because the government would be treating religion the same.120 Although
courts have upheld many governmental acts supporting religion,121 this effect prong of Lemon is inherently strict and limits nearly any government
involvement with religion.122
Justice O’Connor somewhat clarified the final prong of Lemon, explaining that “excessive entanglement” is limited to “institutional entan-

118.
See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691.
119.
See Mark Strasser, Passive Observers, Passive Displays, and the Establishment
Clause, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1123, 1156-57 (2010) (explaining that “members of the
Court have more recently suggested that the passive quality of a display is constitutionally
significant without explaining how that passive quality is to be identified or what constitutional significance such a factor has”).
120.
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(holding that a school program neutral toward religion in funding would not violate the
establishment clause). In Rosenberger, Justice Kennedy wrote that “[i]t does not violate the
Establishment Clause for a public university to grant access to its facilities on a religionneutral basis to a wide spectrum of student groups, including groups that use meeting rooms
for sectarian activities, accompanied by some devotional exercises. Id. at 842. This “inhibiting religion” aspect of Lemon appears to extend into the free exercise clause, which typically
comes into play when dealing with public forums. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 267 (1981) (noting that since the university had “created a forum generally open for use
by student groups [the university was required to] justify its discriminations and exclusions
under applicable constitutional norms”).
121.
See, e.g., Kong v. Scully, 341 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that
“[a]ccommodation of a religious minority to let them practice their religion without penalty
is a lawful secular purpose”); Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., Ga., 547 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2008)
(upholding the practice of prayer before county planning commission meetings).
122.
Some people may wonder why it even matters that this test has been criticized
for being too restrictive of religion. As mentioned in the introduction, there are two religion
clauses, one which limits government involvement with religion (establishment clause) and
the other which ensures that the government does not restrict individual religious freedom
(free exercise clause). See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 14, at 1275 (“[The clauses]
protect overlapping values, but they often exert conflicting pressures.”). As such, Lemon
tends to be so strict as to inhibit religious freedom. This, of course, is violative of the First
Amendment, and is unacceptable. While most scholars and citizens have not gone so far as
to state that the Lemon test is unconstitutional, the test itself allows for application that
would effectively limit religious freedom. Consequently, new tests were needed so as to
improve upon the Lemon test.
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glement.”123 This simply disallows “extensive government intrusion into the
affairs of a religious enterprise.”124 It is difficult to imagine a government
intruding into religious affairs when it simply allows a private group to display a religious symbol on or in government property. This passive act
hardly seems to meet the level of excessive entanglement. It seems more
fitting to classify the public display of religious symbols as constituting
minimal entanglement, as the government is not making an active effort to
promote a religion.
What is commonly disliked about the Lemon test is not its difficulty in
application (as most have found it to be rather straightforward) but rather
that, if strictly applied, most governmental programs or acts would be found
unconstitutional.125 Perhaps the use of this test should be limited to cases
involving overt governmental acts interspersed with religion (e.g., granting
of funds) rather than cases involving public displays of religious symbols.
Situations involving overt governmental action run a higher risk of violating the establishment clause, so these cases should be subjected to higher
levels of scrutiny, perhaps, via the Lemon test. Contrastingly, passive religious displays do not run such a risk, so such cases should not be subjected
to the scrutiny of the Lemon test, regardless of the social context of the display. In its original form, Lemon has been largely abandoned, but it became
commonly used after it was re-introduced in the form of Justice O’Connor’s
endorsement test.126
123.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The
entanglement prong of the Lemon test is properly limited to institutional entanglement.”).
124.
Gey, supra note 101, at 762.
125.
See id.; Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding a supper
prayer at the Virginia Military Institute to be a violation of the First Amendment under the
Lemon test); ACLU of Ohio Found., Inc. v. DeWeese, 633 F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding
that a state judge’s Ten Commandments poster in his courtroom violated the establishment
clause under the Lemon-endorsement test). See also Lisa M. Kahle, Comment, Making
“Lemon-Aid” from the Supreme Court's Lemon: Why Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Should Be Replaced by a Modified Coercion Test, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 349, 363
(2005) (“[A]ll three prongs of the Lemon test contain inherent flaws that prevent the test
from being practically workable in a satisfactory manner. Application of the Lemon test in
actual cases has also failed.”); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 419 (1985) (failing to provide government neutrality with respect to religion in application of the Lemon test).
126.
Smith, supra note 105, at 107 (“While most courts have concluded that Lemon
may apply in some circumstances and has not been expressly overruled, the lower courts
have largely ignored it.”). Another scholar noted that:
When O'Connor first proposed the endorsement test, she
claimed to be merely suggesting a clarification of Lemon. Yet,
if it were a clarification, it would simply be a more detailed
explanation of the Lemon test and not alter the basic direction
of Lemon's inquiry. Instead, the endorsement test replaces the
foci of the Lemon test with foci of its own, thereby altering the
test considerably; how state action affects religion is no longer
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CRITICISMS, CONUNDRUMS, AND CLARIFICATIONS OF THE
ENDORSEMENT TEST

The endorsement test has been commonly applied in most recent establishment clause cases.127 This is perhaps because courts find it to be a
fair and just middle ground between the overbearing restrictiveness of the
Lemon test and the overt leniency of the coercion test.128

1.

Lemon-Endorsement, Applied

In 2010, the Sixth Circuit decided a case in which the court applied a
modified version of the Lemon test for its analysis.129 In ACLU of Kentucky
v. Grayson County, the county approved the hanging of the Ten Commandments in the courthouse along with other displays to acknowledge the
foundations of American law and government.130 The court applied a modified version of the 1971 Lemon test, which involved clarifications by the
Supreme Court in McCreary County, Kentucky. v. American Civil Liberties
Union of Kentucky.131 In McCreary County, the Supreme Court further explained the “secular purpose” prong of the Lemon test by stating that the
secular reason for putting up a religious display must be “genuine, not a
sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective.”132 The Sixth Circuit also added that this purpose must be determined from the perspective
of the reasonable observer.133 The court held the “secular purpose of enimportant. Rather, the endorsement test focuses on how people
perceive the relationship between the state and religion. The
endorsement and Lemon tests are different approaches that often yield divergent results.
Joel S. Jacobs, Endorsement As “Adoptive Action:” A Suggested Definition of, and an Argument for, Justice O’Connor’s Establishment Clause Test, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 29, 35
(1994).
127.
E.g., Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, 1121 (10th Cir. 2010);
Ritell v. Vill. of Briarcliff Manor, 466 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that the
village’s display of a menorah during the holiday season appeared to endorse the Jewish
faith in violation of the establishment clause); Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n v. Clarke,
588 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 2009).
128.
See R. George Wright, Why a Coercion Test Is of No Use in Establishment
Clause Cases, 41 CUMB. L. REV. 193 (2011) (arguing that the coercion test provides no
definite answers in religion cases); Jacobs, supra note 126, at 72 (“‘Coercion’-type tests,
regardless of how formulated, are inadequate because they are vague, and ultimately either
too harsh or too lax.”).
129.
See ACLU of Ky. v. Grayson Cnty., 591 F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 2010).
130.
This included the Declaration of Independence, Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights,
and other displays. Grayson Cnty., 591 F.3d at 841.
131.
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
132.
Id. at 865. See also Grayson Cnty., 591 F.3d at 844.
133.
See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 862; Grayson Cnty., 591 F.3d at 848.
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hancing civic morality rather than an explicitly religious purpose” was the
true motivation for putting up the Ten Commandments.134 In addition to the
purpose prong, the court also applied the reasonable observer standard to
the effect prong of the Lemon test, as it was introduced by Justice O’Connor
in her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly.135 The court did not use the last
prong of the Lemon test in its analysis, but instead just used the first two
prongs to determine that there was not “excessive entanglement.”136 Purporting to have applied Lemon, the court essentially applied the endorsement test, though it never stated that it did so.

2.

Problems Defining the “Reasonable Observer”

The endorsement test, or “Lemon/endorsement test” as it is also
known,137 is simply a modification or clarification of the Lemon test. Justice
O’Connor, in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, likely did not
intend to create a new test.138 Her re-interpretation of the Lemon test was an
improvement, as it was not so hostile toward and restrictive of religion.139
Interestingly, with regard to holiday display cases, Justice O’Connor indicated no opposition to permitting the government to celebrate religion publicly.140 This showed that, at least in this specific context, she would apply
her endorsement test less strictly.
Although the endorsement test is an improvement of the Lemon test in
many respects, it still falls short in some areas. Scholars have denoted three
fundamental flaws within the endorsement test as well as the Lemon test:
134.
135.

Grayson Cnty., 591 F.3d at 850.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). See Grayson Cnty., 591 F.3d at

854.
136.
Grayson Cnty., 591 F.3d at 856. See Denise Mashburn, Note, ACLU v. Grayson
County, 43 URB. LAW. 628, 629 (2011).
137.
See, e.g., Utah Highway Patrol Ass'n. v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing Justice O’Connor’s test as the “Lemon/Endorsement
test”).
138.
See Lynch, 465 U.S. 668 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I write separately to
suggest a clarification of our Establishment Clause doctrine.”). See also Marbury, supra note
12, at 572-73 (“Despite its somewhat frequent use, this [endorsement] test, in many ways, is
nothing more than a re-worked version of the Lemon test–a derivative of the first (secular
purpose) and second (primary effect) prongs of Lemon.” (internal quotations omitted)).
139.
See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573
(1989) (adopting the endorsement test even though the Lemon test was controlling law at the
time); Kahle, supra note 125, at 365 (“The endorsement test is also commendable because it
allows the government to make certain accommodations for both minority and mainstream
religions.”).
140.
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (noting that the city's display of a Christmas crèche
“d[id] not have the effect of communicating endorsement of Christianity”). See also Gey,
supra note 101, at 738 (“In the holiday display cases . . . [Justice O’Connor] indicated that
she had no problem with permitting the government to celebrate religion publicly.”).
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(1) uncertainty as to who is the relevant person to judge the
effect of the government act, (2) malleability of results
reached by the application of the test due to its inherent
subjectivity and heavy factual dependence, and (3) inability
of the test to account for past decisions of the Court.141
Justice Kennedy added, in his opinion in County of Allegheny, that the endorsement test produces results inconsistent with the history and tradition of
the establishment clause.142
Regarding the first of the fundamental flaws, the mechanism of using
the objective observer standard has provided more problems than solutions
and has been criticized as being an unhelpful aspect of the test.143 Although
this standard is similar to that which is commonly used in tort law,144 its
application in establishment clause cases has created more problems than it
likely has in tort law. The concern is that the reasonable observer will never
be fully objective.145 Although a judge may try to determine what a reasonable person might believe in regards to religious displays, he will nevertheless be influenced by his own background and knowledge, thus causing the
standard to have subjective tendencies.146 As a result, a judge in one part of
the country deciding a case on the issue of whether the Ten Commandments
may be hung in a courthouse may decide differently than a judge residing in
a different part of the country deciding a factually identical case.147
141.
The Supreme Court, 1988 Term, Government-Sponsored Religious Displays,
103 HARV. L. REV. 228, 234 (1989).
142.
See Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670 (“Few of our traditional practices recognizing the part religion plays in our society can withstand scrutiny under a faithful application of this formula.”).
143.
See, e.g., Marbury, supra note 12, at 572-73; Susan Hanley Kosse, A Missed
Opportunity to Abandon the Reasonable Observer Framework in Sacred Text Cases:
McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky and Van Orden v. Perry, 4 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
139 (2006); Gey, supra note 101, at 738-39.
144.
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that the reasonable observer “is similar to
the ‘reasonable person’ in tort law, who ‘is not to be identified with any ordinary individual,
who might occasionally do unreasonable things,’ but is ‘rather a personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the [collective] social judgment”’ (quoting W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984))).
145.
Gey, supra note 101, at 738-39 (“The problem with the reasonable observer
mechanism is that the observer will never be truly objective.”).
146.
Id. at 739 (“The results a judge obtains from applying the reasonable observer
analysis therefore will depend entirely on what background knowledge and cultural assumptions the judge feeds to the observer.”).
147.
See Marbury, supra note 12, at 565-67. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 687 (1984) (upholding the display of a nativity scene in a city in Rhode Island); Cnty.
of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1989) (striking
down display of nativity scene in front of county courthouse in Pennsylvania).
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This is not to suggest, however, that a subjective test would be any
better.148 In fact, it would likely lead to more inconsistent results than found
currently. In Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, Justice
O’Connor stated that the beliefs of the reasonable person can change with
the context of the case, but generally, the reasonable observer must be
“deemed more informed than the casual passerby” and “aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the religious display
appears.”149 The problem is that courts have not more clearly defined what
the knowledge and beliefs of the reasonable person are in regards to religious displays, and even if they had, the standard would still be challenging
in practice simply because judges cannot help being human in nature.150
Humans are influenced by any number of factors—prejudice, culture, background, personal experience, knowledge, etc.—and it is not in a human’s
capacity to be wholly objective.151 Courts have questioned what the religious knowledge and beliefs of this objective observer are.152 Is this observer religious? Is this person an atheist? An agnostic? The Supreme Court
would likely conclude that this reasonable observer is none of the above;
however, knowing that the Court would not give a definite description of a
reasonable person’s beliefs provides no guidance for a lower court’s analysis.153
What distinguishes the endorsement test from its predecessor, the
Lemon test, is not only its use of the reasonable person standard but also the
context-specific nature of the test.154 This deference to the context of the
148.
Smith, supra note 105, at 106 (“[T]he objective test is arguably easier to administer than a fact-intensive subjective test . . . .”).
149.
Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
150.
See Kosse, supra note 143, at 149 (“The inherent vagaries associated with the
reasonable observer test in current First Amendment jurisprudence does not provide any
clear guidance to courts regarding this fundamental freedom of the non-Establishment of
religion.”).
151.
See ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289,
302-03 (6th Cir. 2001); James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible? The Post-Modern Subject in
Legal Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 489 (1991) (arguing about the subjectivism of objectivity).
152.
See Skoros v. City of New York, 437 F.3d 1, 23-24 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e do
not think the intended recipient of a display necessarily defines the objective observer.”).
153.
See, e.g., Pinette, 515 U.S. at 755 (“In this context, the 'reasonable observer' is
the personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the collective social judgment, whose knowledge is not limited to information gleaned from viewing
the challenged display, but extends to the general history of the place in which the display
appears.”).
154.
See Gey, supra note 101, at 739. See also Detroy, supra note 101, at 607
(“Again, the focus of the endorsement test is on the sentiments of actual persons, not imaginary characters presumed to know everything related to a particular piece of legislation and
its context.”).
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case “introduces an unfortunate level of uncertainty” that makes it difficult
for courts and government officials to determine at what point the government is “endorsing” religion.155 It is not so much that context is a terrible
factor to use in analysis but merely that, because the endorsement test relies
so heavily on context, it essentially uses context as the sole factor in decision-making.156 In effect, this contextual aspect of the endorsement test
causes many cases to be decided on an individual case-by-case analysis,
with little regard for precedent.157

3.

Defining “Endorsement”

According to a thesaurus, synonyms of the word “endorsement” include the words “sanction” and “advocacy.”158 When something is sanctioned, it is being approved or permitted.159 These words indicate some sort
of passive involvement, rather than any affirmative act.160 On the other
hand, when something is advocated for, there is more active involvement
and a sense of desire to promote whatever is being supported.161 These
words, all synonyms of “endorsement,” are somewhat conflicting. What
does it mean to “endorse” religion? Perhaps “endorsement” is similar to the
155.
Gey, supra note 101, at 739.
156.
Id.
157.
E.g., Modrovich v. Allegheny Cnty., 385 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that
the display of a plaque of the Ten Commandments affixed to the county courthouse did not
violate the establishment clause under the endorsement test); Freethought Soc'y of Greater
Philadelphia v. Chester Cnty., 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that display of Ten
Commandments plaque on county courthouse was not an endorsement of religion); Adland
v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that monument with Ten Commandments
inscribed on it would endorse religion if the monument were placed on state capitol
grounds); ACLU of Tennessee v. Rutherford Cnty., 209 F. Supp. 2d 799 (M.D. Tenn. 2002)
(holding that display of Ten Commandments in courthouse lobby violated the establishment
clause).
158.
Endorsement Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/endorsement (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). See
also MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 382 (10th ed. 1994).
159.
Advocate Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/advocate (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). See also MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 18 (10th ed. 1994).
160.
Think, for example, of a case involving the display of a nativity scene. The
government’s allowance of the crèche’s display was more of a passive act, but the display of
the crèche as an exercise of free speech required more active involvement. See Smith v.
Lindstrom, 699 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Va. 1988) (“Although the Court in Lynch referred to the
crèche as a ‘passive symbol,’ the effect of well-crafted symbolic speech is anything but
passive, quiet, or ineffective.”).
161.
Advocate Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/advocate (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). See also MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 18 (10th ed. 1994).
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“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard which many courts have refused to
define or clarify for juries in order to avoid confusing jurors any more than
necessary.162 After all, the word “endorse,” in itself, is not a complicated
word until someone finds conflicting meanings.
The Supreme Court has, however, taken some steps to define “endorsement” beyond Justice O’Connor’s original explanation. In Wallace v.
Jaffree, Justice O’Connor noted in her concurring opinion that a government may endorse religion when it conveys a message that “religion or a
particular religious belief is favored or preferred.”163 Beyond equating endorsement with favoritism or preference, the Court also referred to endorsement as being “closely linked to the term ‘promotion.’”164 By associating “endorsement” with other words such as “promotion,” “favoritism,”
or “preference,” the Court seems to have accepted the more proactive interpretation of the word which requires more government involvement.165

4.

The Endorsement Analysis and Religious Displays

If the Court were to apply the “sanction” definition of “endorsement,”
then no religious display or governmental act involving religion in the
slightest would be found constitutional. Since the Supreme Court has in
162.

As one writer notes:
The lack of any explanation by Justice O'Connor as to the
dangers of alienating religious minorities ultimately undermines the legitimacy of the endorsement test. Moreover, Justice O'Connor's adoption of the “objective observer” criteria
fails to take account of relevant perceptions, leaving the fate of
an endorsement claim squarely within the purview of nothing
more than a legal fiction.
Detroy, supra note 101, at 605. See also United States v. Glass, 846 F.2d 386, 386 (7th Cir.
1988) (“‘Reasonable doubt’ must speak for itself. Jurors know what is ‘reasonable’ and are
quite familiar with the meaning of ‘doubt.’ Judges’ and lawyers’ attempts to inject other
amorphous catch-phrases into the ‘reasonable doubt’ standard . . . only muddy the water . . .
.”).
163. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
164. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 593
(1989).
165.
Whether the key word is “endorsement,” “favoritism,” or
“promotion,” the essential principle remains the same. The
Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government
from appearing to take a position on questions of religious
belief or from “making adherence to a religion relevant in any
way to a person's standing in the political community.”
Id. at 593-94 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S., at 687 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
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numerous instances allowed the government to have some involvement
with religion,166 and because Justice O’Connor herself conceded that the
public celebration of religion through the display of religious symbols under her endorsement analysis was constitutional, 167 the Court likely did not
mean for “endorse” to be synonymous with “sanction.” This is further proof
that the Court’s interpretation of the endorsement analysis was not meant to
apply in situations involving submissive government action.
Therefore, in all establishment clause cases applying the endorsement
test, only when the government is actively taking part in advocating particular religions does the constitutionality of religious displays even come into
question. Religious displays are passive in nature; there is no active government involvement.168 Rather, the government is merely “authorizing”
the use of public property for the display of a religious symbol. Hence, it is
important to distinguish between governmental authorization of the public
display of a religious symbol and governmental advocacy for a particular
religion. It appears under these definitions, therefore, that Justice
O’Connor’s endorsement analysis is not wholly applicable to cases involving the public display of religious symbols.
As mentioned earlier, Justice O’Connor stated that the establishment
clause cannot only be violated when the government endorses religion but
also when the government “disapproves” of religion.169 The word “disapprove” has been defined as “rejecting” or holding an “unfavorable opinion
about something.”170 Although these definitions provide a stronger sense of
dislike and disfavor, they are less in conflict with each other and seem to
cause fewer, if any, problems with regard to what it means to “disapprove”
of a religious symbol. Let us again ask the question earlier mentioned when
discussing Lemon: if the government refuses to allow the display of a religious symbol on public property, is it “disapproving” of religion? Again,
the answer is probably “no.” The government is “rejecting” religion, but so
long as there is an opportunity to display the religious symbol elsewhere

166.
See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that a state cannot
require citizens to have the state motto, which promoted a religious ideology, on license
plates under endorsement); Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001)
(holding that the school could not exclude Christian clubs under endorsement).
167.
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692-93 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
168.
See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691-92 (2005).
169.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
170.
Disapprove Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/thesaurus/disapprove (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). See also MERRIAMWEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 329 (10th ed. 1994); Disapprove Definition, OXFORD
DICTIONARIES,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_english/disapprove?q=disapprove (last
visited Feb. 21, 2014).
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(perhaps on private property), the religious display is not being “rejected”
in its entirety.171
If the question is reversed, and the local government does permit the
display of a religious symbol, for example, a copy of the Ten Commandments, to be hung in a government building, would this cause an objective
observer to feel like an outsider to the political community?172 This question is more difficult to answer and would probably provoke some heated
debate. However, it may be more difficult to accept that an objective observer would be so shocked or offended by this symbol with inherently religious meaning that this person would begin to question whether they fit in
with society. On the other hand, a mandatory prayer observing a specific
religion in a public school would much more likely cause students not adherent to that religion to feel like political outsiders.173 There are acute differences between these two scenarios: in one scene, the government is
merely allowing a symbol with religious meaning to be located on public
property, while in the other situation, the government is actively involved in
promoting a religion.174 The endorsement test, though more favorable to
religious freedom than Lemon, is still inadequate in its analysis for situations involving the public displays of religious symbols, which are uniquely
different than other establishment clause cases.
C.

CRITICISMS, CONUNDRUMS AND CLARIFICATIONS OF THE
COERCION TEST

1.

Criticisms of Coercion

There are essentially three main elements of the coercion analysis. A
government directly coerces an individual when it:
(1) intentionally (2) forces him or her to make a choice between religion and nonreligion (or between one religion
and another) and (3) weights that choice with an express
171.
See Disapprove Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriamwebster.com/thesaurus/disapprove (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). The “disapproval” aspect of
the endorsement analysis adheres more to the free speech clause. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (holding that the school district violated the free speech clause by denying a church access to school premises).
172.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680-81.
173.
See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (striking down the act of prayer
at graduation ceremonies).
174.
Another inquiry would be to question whether causing an objective observer to
feel like a political outsider to the community would constitute an “injury” which would
grant a party standing to sue under Article III of the Constitution, but that is not within the
scope of this Comment to be further discussed.
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negative sanction (such as a legally imposed fine or other
punishment) for choosing in a way that the state does not
approve.175
More concisely said, coercion involves a forced choice, threat of sanction,
and coercive intent.176 Coercion may also occur indirectly, as noted in Santa
Fe Independent School District v. Doe, a case involving student-led prayer
prior to school-sponsored football games.177 This test has been criticized as
producing “so few limits on government involvement with religion that it
leaves the Establishment Clause in tatters.”178 Some scholars have interpreted the word “coercion” very narrowly, arguing that coercion prohibits
“only the most egregious and overt government actions benefitting or advancing religion.”179 The term “coercion” is most commonly understood as
an act of persuasion by use or threat of force or putting a party under duress.180 Under this definition, few government actions would be understood
to be “coercing” individuals to participate in religious activity against their
will.181
The coercion test, like most other tests, also somewhat depends on
contextual matters in that the recognition of the presence or absence of coercion depends on the context and circumstances surrounding the situation,
which some scholars have considered a quandary.182 Another impediment
to applying the coercion test to religious display cases is that many lower
courts assume that this analysis is only applicable in cases involving
school-sponsored religious activity.183 One such case is Lee v. Weisman,
175.
Cynthia V. Ward, Coercion and Choice Under the Establishment Clause, 39
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1621, 1659-60 (2006).
176.
See id. at 1643 (“Coercion occurs when one man's actions are made to serve
another man’s will, not for his own but for the other’s purpose.” (internal quotations omitted)).
177.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000) (The “choice between whether to attend these [football] games or to risk facing a personally offensive religious ritual is in no practical sense an easy one. The Constitution, moreover, demands that
the school may not force this difficult choice on students.”).
178.
Gey, supra note 101, at 740.
179.
Id. at 743.
180.
See Coercion Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/coercion (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). See also
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 222 (10th ed. 1994); Coercion Definition,
OXFORD DICTIONARIES,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/coercion?q=coercion (last visited Feb. 21,
2014); Gey, supra note 101, at 740.
181.
See Gey, supra note 101, at 740.
182.
See Wright, supra note 128, at 203 (noting that “coercion, or the absence of
coercion, is typically a contextual matter”).
183.
See, e.g., Borden v. Sch. Dist. of East Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 175 (3d Cir.
2008) (not finding the coercion test applicable); Briggs v. Mississippi, 331 F.3d 499, 505
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where the test was used to hold that a prayer by a clergyman at a high
school graduation ceremony was unconstitutionally coercive.184 Justice
Scalia noted in Lee v. Weisman that “[t]he coercion that was a hallmark of
historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy
and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.”185 Most notably, however, is that many scholars and judges agree that the coercion
analysis is far too lenient and strongly favors religion over court neutrality
and secularity.186

2.

Refuting the Criticisms of Coercion

While there have been concerns about the seemingly deferential level
of review of the coercion test, Justice Kennedy refuted this argument by
noting that coercion may be as subtle as simply accommodating a faith and
that, in extreme cases, passive displays would not pass the scrutiny of the
coercion test.187 Justice Kennedy, when he introduced his test, expanded the
dictionary definition of “coercion,”188 which had originally only recognized
direct, not-so-subtle coercive acts.189 In addition, it is inaccurate to assume
that the coercion test is only meant to apply in school-sponsored religious
activity cases because, after all, Justice Kennedy introduced his test in a
case where the facts involved public displays of religious symbols,190 and
Justice Thomas expressed support for Justice Kennedy’s coercion test in
another factually similar case involving religious displays.191 As such, this
does not mean that the coercion test cannot be applied to cases with facts
involving religious displays but rather that the test should apply to these
types of cases since that is where some Supreme Court justices have held it
should apply. In truth, when the coercion test is actually applied to religious

(5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. 185 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 1999))
(stating that the coercion test “analyzes school-sponsored religious activity in terms of the
coercive effect that the activity has on students. That test is facially inapplicable here”). Note
that regardless of whether courts continue to use the coercion test in school-sponsored religious activity cases, this Comment merely argues that religious display cases are best fitted
by the coercion test, and not that the coercion test may not be used for other religion cases.
Such an argument is beyond the scope of this Comment.
184.
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992).
185.
Id. at 640 (emphasis omitted).
186.
See, e.g., Wright, supra note 128.
187.
See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
661-62 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
188.
See id. at 659-63.
189.
See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 222 (10th ed. 1994).
190.
Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
191.
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693-97 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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display cases, it stands above the other tests as the most easily applicable
analysis, providing the fairest and most just results.

3.

The Coercion Test, Applied

Most, if not all, judges and scholars who have criticized the coercion
test have failed to consider that there may not necessarily be one single test
for all establishment clause jurisprudence,192 but the coercion analysis may
apply to one specific area within cases involving religion. That area is the
public display of religious symbols.193
Imagine again that a local government has refused to let a private
group display a religious symbol (say, a plaque of the Ten Commandments)
on the inner walls of the county courthouse. This scenario would probably
not invoke the usage of the coercion test, but may cause other issues involving the free exercise clause, which is not within the scope of this Comment.
However, if the situation is again reversed and the local government allows
a small plaque of the Ten Commandments to be displayed inside the main
lobby of a county courthouse, would this amount to unconstitutional coercion? First, there has been no threat of penalty, nor any act to persuade individuals to choose between religion and non-religion or do something
against their will. By simply hanging the plaque on the wall, there has been
no coercive action by the government. Thus, under the coercion test, the
hanging of the Ten Commandments would probably not violate the establishment clause.
D.

CRITICISMS, CONUNDRUMS, AND CLARIFICATIONS OF THE
VAN ORDEN TEST

The biggest problem with the Van Orden test is that most courts do not
recognize it as an actual test in and of itself, and few scholars, if any, ever
discuss Van Orden as a form of analysis when discussing establishment
clause jurisprudence.194 Only when the facts in a case are similar to Van
Orden has this “test” been applied.
192.
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984). See also Michele Hyndman,
Tradition Is Not Law: Advocating a Single Determinative Test for Establishment Clause
Cases, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 101 (2005) (promoting a single test to apply to all establishment clause cases).
193.
While other religious tests may better apply in other religious contexts, the
scope of this Comment is limited to discussing the benefits of applying only the coercion test
to only cases involving the public display of religious symbols.
194.
E.g., Daniel O. Conkle, Religious Expression and Symbolism in the American
Constitutional Tradition: Governmental Neutrality, but not Indifference, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 417 (2006).
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In ACLU Nebraska Foundation v. City of Plattsmouth, the Eighth Circuit applied the Van Orden analysis, noting the factual similarity between
the two cases.195 Like the monument in Van Orden, the Eighth Circuit noted
the monument containing the Ten Commandments was also a “passive–and
permissible–use of the text of the Ten Commandments to acknowledge the
role of religion in our Nation’s heritage.”196 The greatest weakness for Van
Orden is that it has hardly been recognized as an establishment clause test.
Yet while Van Orden may not be widely applied as a common establishment clause test like the others, it still retains strong precedential value
within specific factual scenarios.197

IV. WHY THE COERCION TEST IS THE BEST FOR RELIGIOUS DISPLAY
CASES
A.

THE GOVERNMENT GENERALLY ACTS PASSIVELY

It has been mentioned several times throughout this Comment that religious displays are passive symbols. This has been noted many times by
Supreme Court justices.198 These displays are passive, because the government is making no active effort to support religion.199 It merely allows a
private group to display a religious symbol on public property, or the governmental body itself displays such a symbol usually for reasons involving
history and tradition.200 On the other hand, in non-religious display cases,
there is a keen difference. During a prayer at graduation given by a single
religious leader, graduates and attendees are, in a sense, obligated to attend
and participate.201 Contrastingly, religious displays, for the most part, require no such active involvement by citizens or by the government. A religious symbol may sit on the ground or hang on a wall, but it will create no
obligation to look at it, to acknowledge it, or to adhere to its religion. A
passerby may simply ignore the religious monument.202
195.
ACLU Nebraska Found. v. Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005).
196.
Id. at 776-77.
197.
See generally Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772.
198.
See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,
663-64 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
199.
See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).
200.
See id. at 687-90.
201.
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992) (“State officials direct the performance of a formal religious exercise at promotional and graduation ceremonies . . . [and]
attendance and participation in the state-sponsored religious activity are in a fair and real
sense obligatory . . . .”). It is important to note, however, that not all prayer has been held
unconstitutional, but again, this determination depends on the context and circumstances.
See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
202.
See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 694 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Holiday religious displays are even less likely to violate the Establishment Clause because they are temporary displays, not permanent. After
all, even Justice O’Connor conceded that holiday displays may be constitutional under her endorsement test, which provides for a more stringent
analysis than the coercion test.203 The holidays are unique times in which
non-religious folk are celebrating what have originally been religious holidays.204 It would be difficult to argue under the coercion test that the government would be coercing citizens to accept Christianity through the display of a symbol such as the Christmas tree, which, although often recognized as a secular symbol, still celebrates a Christian holiday.205
While religious displays usually do not require or entail such a high
level of government involvement as in other religion cases (i.e., granting of
funding to religious programs), there are still situations in which a religious
display may violate the establishment clause. Imagine, for instance, a state
has passed a law requiring the Ten Commandments to be posted in every
classroom in every public school within the state.206 This act by the government is coercive for several reasons. First, the government is not acting
passively; the legislature took an active initiative to promote JudeoChristian beliefs, both of which recognize the Ten Commandments as a part
of their Old Testament scriptures.207 There would not only have been direct
coercion on the teachers and students, but the coercion would have been
even more direct on school administrations that had no choice in the matter.
Finally, and most importantly, this law would be coercive because there
was a “force of law and threat of penalty”208 since refusing to comply
would have resulted in a violation of state law. Such was the exact scenario
previously depicted in the 1980 Supreme Court case, Stone v. Graham.209

203.
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692-93 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
204.
See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 631
(1989) (“Similarly, the celebration of Thanksgiving as a public holiday, despite
its religious origins, is now generally understood as a celebration of patriotic values rather
than particular religious beliefs.”).
205.
Id. at 616 (“The Christmas tree, unlike the menorah, is not itself
a religious symbol. Although Christmas trees once carried religious connotations, today they
typify the secular celebration of Christmas.”).
206.
E.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). Note that this case was decided
before the inception of the coercion test in 1989 in Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 583.
207.
See Stone, 449 U.S. at 41 (“The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred
text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular
purpose can blind us to that fact.” (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992))).
208.
See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(emphasis omitted).
209.
Stone, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
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This was a rather extreme case210 of government involvement with religion,
in which a state legislature effectively “established” a state religion.211
Hopefully this Comment has illustrated to you, dear reader, that religious symbols are unlike other government acts involving religion, because
these displays are passive in nature. There exists a great deal of historical
art containing undisputed religious themes; however, the required study of
such art has never been considered unconstitutional.212 Similarly, as religious displays are passive in nature, there is a lower likelihood of violating
the establishment clause. As such, religious displays should be subject to a
more lenient standard of review, which has been best exemplified in the
form of the coercion test. The coercion test, while criticized for its leniency,
is not deferential, as the paragraphs above have elucidated. There are additional reasons that the coercion test may be the best choice for analyzing
religious display cases.
B.

THE PURPOSE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE IS BEST
FULFILLED BY THE COERCION TEST

The establishment clause, as earlier stated, says that “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”213 If we look
closely at the words, it is simple to see that the coercion test most accurately represents the original intent and meaning of the establishment clause. To
“establish” means to institute, to show something to be true, to bring into
existence, or to found something.214 “Endorsement” does not have the same
meaning as “establishment,” and the endorsement test goes beyond the
original meaning of the establishment clause.215 Justice Thomas argued in
an earlier case that the Court should return to the original meaning of the
establishment clause,216 while hinting that the coercion test may best fulfill
210.
See Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
211.
See id. at 659 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
212.
Bruce Ledewitz, Toward a Meaning-Full Establishment Clause Neutrality, 87
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 725, 757 (2012) (“Great art with religious themes may also bring students to God, but studying such art is not unconstitutional.”).
213.
U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
214.
See Establish Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 397
(10th ed. 1994); Definition of Establish in English, OXFORD DICTIONARIES: LANGUAGE
MATTERS, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/establish?q=establish (last visited
Feb. 21, 2014). See also Establish Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/establish (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
215.
See Endorsement Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 382
(10th ed. 1994); Endorsement Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/endorsement (last visited Feb 21, 2014).
216.
See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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the original purpose of the establishment clause.217 Furthermore, when Justice Kennedy introduced the coercion test, he even used the word “establish” as part of the test's analysis.218
C.

SECULARISM CAN STILL BE ACCOMPLISHED

When the Supreme Court decides establishment clause cases, the
Court examines whether there is a secular purpose or effect in a religious
display.219 This is examined even when applying the coercion test.
“Secularism” has been defined as indifference to, rejection or exclusion of, or having no connection to religion.220 Yet even having the dictionary definition of “secularism” does not provide a clear and helpful answer
as to what exactly “secular” means. Scholars have observed that it is “not
entirely clear what is meant by secularism.”221 One author has described
two traditional meanings and uses of secularism: the first is “an approach to
religion-state relations that avoids identification of the state with any particular religion or ideology (including secularism itself) and that endeavours
to provide a neutral framework capable of accommodating a broad range of
religions and beliefs,” and the second is “an ideological position that is
committed to promoting a secular order.”222
Most people today would associate the word “secular” to mean “nonreligious.”223 This, however, is an inaccurate interpretation of the word.224
Professor Zachary Calo of the Valparaiso University School of Law pro-

217.
See id. at 697.
218.
Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 662
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
219.
See id. at 610.
220.
See Secular Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1056
(10th ed. 1994); Definition of Secular in English, OXFORD DICTIONARIES: LANGUAGE
MATTERS ,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/secular?q=secularity#secular__23 (last
visited Feb. 21, 2014). See also Secularism Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/secularism (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
221.
Charles Taylor, Modes of Secularism, in SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS 31
(Rajeev Bhargava ed., Oxford University Press 2005).
222.
Brett G. Scharffs, Four Views of the Citadel: The Consequential Distinction
Between Secularity and Secularism, 6 RELIGION & HUM. RTS. 109, 110-11 (2011), available
at http://www.iclrs.org/content/blurb/files/RHRS_006_02_109-126.pdf.
223.
Iain T. Benson, That False Struggle Between Believers and Non-Believers 22-25
(Soc. Sci. Research Network, Working Paper No. 1803246, 2010) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1803246.
224.
See id. at 22 (noting that “[t]he idea that ‘secular’ means ‘non-religious’ is a
departure from its original meaning and challenges the idea that religion has a place in the
public sphere”).
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poses in his article a third way of defining secularism.225 He calls this new
idea “higher law secularism.”226 This higher law secularism rests on the
principle that “secular is not to be equated with the absence or negation of
religion.”227 Essentially, judges may not have to worry about choosing between religion or nonreligion when deciding religious display cases.228
In essence, though never stating so bluntly, Professor Calo presents the
idea that religious displays are, for all intents and purposes, secular symbols.229 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that many religious symbols,
namely those that have been upheld by the Court, may have religious and
secular purposes without violating the establishment clause.230 Yet Professor Calo explains that under his higher law secularism, the Court may simply call such religious displays “secular” under his more moderate definition
of secularism.231 In his concurring opinion in Van Orden, Justice Scalia
made an argument that echoed the basic themes of higher law secularism by
stating “that there is nothing unconstitutional in a State's favoring religion
generally, honoring God through public prayer and acknowledgment, or, in
a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten Commandments.”232 Thus,

225.
See generally Zachary R. Calo, Higher Law Secularism: Religious Symbols,
Contested Secularisms, and the Limits of the Establishment Clause, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
811 (2012).
226.
Id. at 812.
227.
Id. at 826.
228.
Professor Calo added that,
[i]n particular, rather than asking whether law should advance
or delimit religious influence in public life, higher law secularism considers how law can direct religion to shape and support
the architecture of a secular political order. In other words,
higher law secularism is premised on the idea that the binary
shaping Establishment Clause jurisprudence rests on the false
premise that law must either defend the goods of religion or
the goods of the secular state.
Id.
229.
Id. at 826-27 (“The secular and the religious are historically and intellectually
tethered, and higher law secularism seeks to reconstruct this genealogical point of contact in
a new form.”).
230.
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690, 692 (2005).
231.
Professor Calo noted that,
[o]pening secular space to religious symbols, particularly if
they advance plural forms of higher law meaning, need not involve the privileging of faith over the secular, but might rather
represent a way of continuing the dialectal process through
which the secular is given meaning. Viewed in this light, higher law secularism should be understood to at least potentially
create space for public religious symbols.
Calo, supra note 225, at 830.
232.
Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692.
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following this “higher law secularism” may help legitimize a court’s decision in upholding a government’s display of religious symbols.
In addition, many religious symbols and other formerly religious acts
have attained secular meaning over time.233 For example, the phrase “under
God” in the Pledge of Allegiance is a simple recognition of the fact “that,
‘[f]rom the time of our earliest history our peoples and our institutions have
reflected the traditional concept that our Nation was founded on a fundamental belief in God,’” and reciting the pledge was not a religious exercise
but a patriotic one.234
D.

COURT NEUTRALITY TOWARD RELIGION CAN STILL BE
ACHIEVED

Another goal of the Court in deciding establishment clause cases is to
achieve neutrality.235 Professor Bruce Ledewitz argues in his article for a
“meaning-full” neutrality that does not favor any particular religious or
non-religious group.236 Similar to the higher law secularism, this “meaningfull” neutrality argues that when a court upholds the public display of some
religious symbol, it is not favoring religion over non-religion and not being
neutral.237 Rather, the court would be upholding the government’s commitments to history and morals.238 Professor Ledewitz gives two reasons to
233.
See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680-81 (1984) (“The City, like the
Congresses and Presidents, however, has principally taken note of a significant historical
religious event long celebrated in the Western World. The crèche in the display depicts the
historical origins of this traditional event long recognized as a National Holiday.”); Van
Orden, 545 U.S. at 688-90 (“Such acknowledgments of the role played by the Ten Commandments in our Nation's heritage are common throughout America . . . . The Executive
and Legislative Branches have also acknowledged the historical role of the Ten Commandments . . . . These displays and recognitions of the Ten Commandments bespeak the rich
American tradition of religious acknowledgments.”).
234.
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 7 (2004) (citing H.R. REP.
NO. 83-1693, at 2 (1954)).
235.
See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion
and nonreligion.”). See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 627 (1992) (“That government
must remain neutral in matters of religion does not foreclose it from ever taking religion into
account.”).
236.
See Ledewitz, supra note 212, at 727-28.
237.
See id. at 745-48.
238.
Professor Ledewitz explained:
[s]o, what I mean by a meaning-full neutrality is a C.S. Lewis
type view of public life that is open to, and indeed relishes, a
comprehensive understanding of human flourishing and states
its claims about these matters expressly in public creeds and in
pedagogical commitments. That public activity would include
spending taxpayer money in support of such substantive moral
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support this “meaning-full” neutrality: (1) although many Supreme Court
justices agree that religious displays are, for the most part, constitutional,
the justices disagree as to why;239 and (2) this new understanding of neutrality would reduce political conflict.240 Supporting a form of neutrality that
does not ban the public display of religious symbols would not weaken a
court’s analysis should it decide to apply the coercion test. Similar to the
“higher law secularism,” using this “meaning-full” neutrality would allow
the Court to uphold religious displays more easily without a fear of not appearing to act in a neutral manner.
E.

CONTEXT STILL MATTERS EVEN UNDER THE COERCION
ANALYSIS

In nearly every establishment clause case, the context of the display
has ultimately determined its constitutionality.241 Courts have decided cases
differently based on the particular public property location of the display,242
the nature of the display,243 the source of sponsorship (public vs. private
funds),244 and the length of the display (temporary vs. permanent).245

and historical claims and subsidizing groups that promote such
claims.
Id. at 747.
239.
[W]hile the Court seems currently settled on upholding most
so-called nonsectarian religious imagery used by government .
. . there is no agreement . . . as to why such religious imagery
is constitutional. These actual and potential rulings are not stable in the way they would be if doctrine in the field were settled.
Id. at 758.
240.
Id. at 759.
241.
E.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573
(1989) (ultimately determining the constitutionality of a menorah and crèche display based
on the specific context and circumstances).
242.
E.g., Suhre v. Haywood Cnty., 55 F. Supp. 2d 384 (W.D. N.C. 1999) (finding a
display of the Ten Commandments in a county courtroom to be constitutional); Granzeier v.
Middleton, 955 F. Supp. 741 (E.D. Ky. 1997), aff’d on other grounds, 173 F.3d 568 (6th Cir.
1999) (holding that crucifix within courtroom was unconstitutional).
243.
See, e.g., Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding
that large white cross that stood at war memorial violated establishment clause); Murray v.
City of Austin, Tex., 947 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding that the city's insignia containing
a cross was constitutional, and did not constitute subtle coercion).
244.
E.g., Knights of Columbus, Council No. 94 v. Town of Lexington, 272 F.3d 25
(1st Cir. 2001) (finding an impermissible use of private funds); Freedom from Religion
Found. v. City of Marshfield, Wis., 203 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding there was a permissible use of private funds).
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Accordingly, even the coercion test, though seemingly more straightforward in application, still requires that a court consider the context and
circumstances of the religious display.246 Many people may fear the coercion test is simply a way for religion to ease into government affairs and
activities or vice versa. Granted, the coercion test may appear more lenient
than the Lemon/endorsement analysis, but the test is stricter than it appears
because context still matters. However, as the endorsement test has been
criticized for its overly contextual analysis, which would lead to inconsistent precedent,247 the coercion test does not solely rely on context to decide constitutionality. While context is still a factor taken into consideration, it is not the sole factor. Thus the coercion test will produce more consistent results.248
Imagine again the scenario given above when discussing the passivity
of the government action.249 This time, however, the details, meaning the
context, are altered slightly.250 In this instance, the plaque of the Ten Commandments is not small and paper-sized (eight-by-ten inches) but it is poster-sized (thirty-six-by-sixty inches). Engraved in large font at the bottom of
the plaque is a verse from the Bible. The plaque sits on an ornate pedestal
rather than being hung on the wall and is located in the main lobby of the
courthouse right in front of the entrance so that all who enter the courthouse
will notice the plaque. Tour guides and security personnel direct visitors to
look at the plaque. The display is still somewhat passive in nature, but the
level of indirect coercion has elevated to the point where it may violate the
establishment clause. In this specific context, the plaque appears to “advance[] religion to such a degree that it actually establishes a religion or
religious faith, or tends to do so.”251 Passersby would have difficulty ignoring the strong message indicated and may attribute any religious coercion to
the government. Although the governmental act itself may be subtle, the
display is not, and the intent is much less subtly trying to persuade individ-

245.
See, e.g., Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding a
temporary display of a crèche constitutional); Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Beverly Hills, 90
F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that temporary display of a menorah was unconstitutional).
246.
See Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 629 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See also id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
247.
See Gey, supra note 101, at 739.
248.
See Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
249.
See supra Part IV.A.
250.
The following scenario follows the basic principles as laid out in McCreary
Cnty. v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
251.
Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
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uals. This is an example of how context would be taken into account when
applying the coercion test.
F.

POLICY REASONS SUPPORT THE COERCION ANALYSIS

On December 4, 2012, the management of a retirement complex in
Los Angeles, California ordered the removal of all Christmas trees and menorahs in common areas because they claimed them to be religious symbols.252 This story is only one example among many others where local
citizens and government officials have not been fully apprised of the complexity of establishment clause jurisprudence regarding religious displays.
In order to protect themselves and prevent any potential lawsuits, they err
on the side of caution and favor a non-religious approach.
Adoption of the coercion analysis for use in religious display cases
would have several benefits. Not only would it assist the courts in their decision-making, but it would also help local citizens and government officials to decide whether to publicly display an allegedly “religious” symbol.
The coercion analysis would be easier for lay folk to understand and apply
as compared to the other more complicated establishment clause tests. Governments would be able to grant the display of such religious symbols without fear of violating the establishment clause. Local government officials
would also know when to refuse to grant the display a religious symbol due
to the overtly coercive context and circumstances. Following a single analysis for this particular set of cases would provide consistency in court decisions and would lead to social and political stability, at least in this arena of
the law. In addition, caseloads for courts would be reduced because the
standard for violating the establishment clause would be much higher, so
the number of petty lawsuits would be reduced.
Imagine that a small Jewish menorah sits against a wall on a small display table within an official county building. There is a small plaque near
the menorah that acknowledges that a Jewish group made a large donation
to complete the construction of this county building. A local citizen who
works in the county building claims that the year-round display of the menorah violates the establishment clause. Under the coercion test, the display
of the menorah would not likely violate the establishment clause. There is
no direct or indirect coercion. The local government is neither attempting to
establish a religion nor appearing to do so. The county has merely displayed

252.
Mariecar Mendoza, Seniors Decry Ban on Christmas Tree in Their Complex in
Newhall, DAILY NEWS, last updated Dec. 4, 2012,
http://www.dailynews.com/ci_22133907/seniors-decry-ban-christmas-tree-their-complexnewhall.
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the menorah as a small “thank you” to the Jewish group for its generous
donation.
The coercion test does not overly favor the religious but rather creates
a more fair and just “fighting ground” between the religious and nonreligious (and all those in between). Governments and courts should not
have to live in fear of violating the establishment clause simply by allowing
passive displays of allegedly “religious” symbols on public property. Oftentimes, even the non-religious person or someone of a different faith will
support a religious display because the symbol is merely a part of history
and tradition.253 Luckily, there is still hope for all who seek consistency and
clarity in establishment clause jurisprudence for religious displays. Just
days after the order by management to remove all Christmas trees and menorahs from common areas, residents of the retirement complex in Los Angeles, after much protesting, were able to save their Christmas trees and
menorahs and keep them in the common areas.254

V. PROPOSED ALTERATIONS TO THE COERCION ANALYSIS
The Federal Rules of Evidence is a code created by Congress to regulate the admission of facts in federal civil and criminal cases. Federal Rule
of Evidence 807 states that under certain circumstances, a hearsay statement may not be excluded even if the statement is not specifically mentioned in the other hearsay exception rules.255 This is known as the “residual
exception” or the catch-all.256 As a safeguard, it is important for rules to
have exceptions and additional catch-all rules to apply under unique circumstances that were not taken into consideration or even thought of when
the rules were made.
Similarly, even the coercion test should have a safeguard catch-all
analysis to use only when absolutely necessary or when the coercion test
would not be helpful to apply in religious display cases (although it is difficult to imagine such a situation). Van Orden adequately provides the necessary catch-all test.257 The reason is because the Van Orden Court did not
253.
Id. (“Frances Schaeffer, who is Jewish, said she doesn't understand the property
management company’s stance. ‘This tree is a symbol of reverence that we can all enjoy
regardless of our religious beliefs,’ she said.”).
254.
Susan Abram & Mariecar Mendoza, Seniors Save Christmas Tree at Apartment
Complex in Newhall, DAILY NEWS, last updated Dec. 6, 2012,
http://www.dailynews.com/ci_22140598.
255.
See FED. R. EVID. 807 (“Under the following circumstances, a hearsay statement
is not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not specifically covered
by a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804.”).
256.
Id.
257.
See generally Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
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apply any specific “test”258 but simply exercised its legal judgment.259 Legal
analysis is nearly always a safe gamble because it allows a court to take into
account the heritage, traditions, and other circumstances of that community
without being limited by any test.260 The coercion test is still better than
Van Orden with regard to religious display cases because it does place limitations on the courts and provides clear factors to follow which will, in turn,
provide for a greater level of consistency.261 Nonetheless, there are always
anomalous cases, and it is necessary for a court to be prepared to analyze
such a case.
When the coercion test is simply inapplicable, or when the court finds
that no coercion has occurred, but still feels that there may be a violation of
the establishment clause, the Van Orden analysis, like an extra pair of eyes
searching for a lost item, may assist the court. Van Orden should only be
applied in absolutely unusual and rare cases. The coercion test is meant to
provide stability, but applying the Van Orden test will not contradict or hurt
the usage of the coercion test, and because it will rarely be applied, it will
have low precedential value outside factually identical cases.262 Also, unlike
the Lemon or endorsement tests, the Van Orden test is not so limiting in its
analysis and will allow a court to exercise its wisdom and discretion when
needed.263

VI. CONCLUSION
Religious displays are unlike other governmental acts involving religion because displays are passive in nature.264 Since the government does
not make any affirmative act to coerce citizens or establish a religion when
it allows religious symbols to be displayed, public displays should be subject to a lower standard of review than other governmental religious acts
(e.g., prayer or granting of funding) in which the government is actively
involved with religion. This lower level of scrutiny is best illustrated in the
form of the coercion test, which fulfills the purposes of the establishment
clause while still continuing to achieve secularism and court neutrality.

258.
See id. at 682.
259.
See id.
260.
See id. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring).
261.
Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 659
(1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part) (noting the limiting principles of the establishment
clause as laid out in the coercion test).
262.
Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677.
263.
Id.
264.
See Cnty. Of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 663-64 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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Religious displays, as argued under higher law secularism and by several Supreme Court justices, have both secular and religious meaning. As
these displays have attained historical and moral significance over time,
their meaning has become more secular.265 Under “meaning-full” neutrality,
a court should not have to be concerned about issues of neutrality when it
allows religious symbols to be publicly displayed. Additionally, the Van
Orden analysis should be instituted as a catch-all test to use only in rare and
unique circumstances when the coercion test would not be applicable in
specific religious display cases. Courts have been wary in recent months of
taking on religious cases; the Supreme Court has denied certiorari,266 and
other courts have simply decided religious display cases on the basis of
standing.267 Now is the time for courts to stand up and make a change.
If courts were to apply these proposed changes to religious display
cases, this would be one step in the direction toward achieving stability and
consistency in establishment clause jurisprudence. These changes would
also assist governmental officials in their decisions to display allegedly
“religious” symbols and would ultimately lead to more social and political
stability. Americans currently live in a society that is so concerned about
secularism, neutrality, and “separation of church and state,”268 that society
has actually become somewhat hostile toward religion in order to not appear hostile toward the non-religious. The changes proposed above may not
only alter future legal analyses but may change the way society views the
relationship between religion and government, ultimately for the betterment
of all.
Justice Scalia noted in his dissenting opinion in McCreary County that
excluding religion from the public forum “is not, and never was, the model
adopted by America.”269 Religion, whether liked or not, is not only part of
this great country’s heritage, but is also part of its identity.270 Religion’s
presence has stretched into adopting Thanksgiving as a national holiday in
265.
See id. at 586-87.
266.
See, e.g., Utah Highway Patrol Ass'n. v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12
(2011).
267.
See, e.g., ACLU of Florida v. Dixie Cnty., 690 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012).
268.
E.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 1 (1947).
269.
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 886 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (continuing to describe the many ways in which religion has seeped into society
and governmental affairs without issue). See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674
(1984) (“There is an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of
government of the role of religion in American life from at least 1789.”).
270.
Justice Scalia wrote in a dissenting opinion that, “[i]nvocation of God despite
[polytheists'] beliefs is permitted not because nonmonotheistic religions cease to be religions
recognized by the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, but because governmental
invocation of God is not an establishment.” McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at, 899-900 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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order to give thanks to God,271 having prayer begin each session of Congress as well as the Supreme Court,272 and finally, displaying an emblem of
the Ten Commandments, located in the very chamber where our Supreme
Court justices decide the constitutionality of such religious displays.273
To accept that religion is part of American heritage and traditions does
not favor religion over nonreligion; indeed, it creates a balance where there
is no conflict between the establishment and free exercise clauses. Modifying legal jurisprudence can help us achieve these objectives. James Wilson,
a Founding Father and signer of the United States Constitution, once wrote:
Far from being rivals or enemies, religion and law are twin
sisters, friends, and mutual assistants. Indeed, these two
sciences run into each other. The divine law, as discovered
by reason and the moral sense, forms an essential part of
both.274
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271.
Id. at 886.
272.
See id. at 895.
273.
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